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does the *procès-verbal* show? In the first place that nothing of the kind was passed on June 25 and in the second place that the motion made to form a citizen guard proposed simply that the National Assembly be asked to sanction the wish of the electors of Paris "pour rétablir la Garde Bourgeoise" and gave no reason whatever for such action. Other evidence, however, shows conclusively that Paris was arming itself against the anticipated royal *coup d'état*. M. Madelin had Sorel for a master, so he tells us. He inherits the defect of his master; his text is more "spirituel" than exact.

FRED MORROW FLING.

Napoléon I^{er} et le Monopole Universitaire. Par A. AULARD, Professeur à la Faculté des Lettres de l'Université de Paris. (Paris: Armand Colin. 1911. Pp. ix, 385.)

SOME of the expressions in Professor Aulard's preface might arouse the suspicion that this volume, if not suggested by existing problems in France, has probably been at least hastened thereby. Not that it is marked by *parti pris*, for indeed it is notably moderate and judicious. But it is for the most part in advance of M. Aulard's profound and steadily progressing study of the great period of reconstruction, and the author himself would probably be the first to admit (as in many places indeed he does admit) that research in the field has not yet proceeded far enough to make possible a conclusive treatment especially in a volume of this brevity. It is a fair (and discouraging) indication of the condition of the study of Napoleonic institutions that one is led to this conclusion in a field that has probably been more debated than any other except the closely allied one of the Church. And as the explanation lies no doubt in this significant word *debated*, it should be taken as an encouraging circumstance that though M. Aulard has in the past been found not infrequently in the ranks of these debaters, this his latest study shows but slight trace of this attitude.

The author is obliged by the brevity of his work to confine himself to a rather insufficient presentation of the conditions which the Napoleonic educational establishments were designed to amend. The Napoleonic system itself is studied with care, though it would appear (from material in the possession of the reviewer) that on some points (as statistics) a closer examination of the archives would enable more definite statements to be made. So far as general conclusions are presented they may be said to be favorable to the Napoleonic educational policy; M. Aulard announces a revision of his earlier conviction that that policy was reactionary, and he dwells with considerable emphasis on the position that in point of fact there was no "monopole universitaire", since the determination to really apply one was reached by Napoleon only in 1811 and since the application of it was then frustrated by Fontanes. This latter position (as to Fontanes) is of course not

new, as Fontanes and his friends made it their boast during the Restoration; the reviewer will not commit himself on a point he regards as still unsettled, and will confine himself to a regret that M. Aulard's conclusion should rest so largely on the by no means impeccable testimony of Ambroise Rendu.

A more important question is raised by M. Aulard's interpretation of Napoleon's attitude in regard to the participation of the Church in secular education—a question which one would infer from the author's preface he has had peculiarly in mind. The view taken here is that Napoleon intended to employ and did employ the Church in his educational system, and that he did so (turning over religious instruction in the *lycées* to ecclesiastics, and allowing the Church to have its own preparatory schools, classed and supervised as state secondary schools), because he wanted to be in a position to watch and control the Church in the field of education. On the whole this interpretation is not quite satisfying, mainly because it is incomplete. As the policy of the preceding régime is represented by M. Aulard as that of fighting the Church through the school, we feel that there needs first to be discussed the question as to whether Napoleon was in principle favorable to ecclesiastical participation in secular education. His actual measures in favor of such participation do not settle the point; for as the Church had been re-established and thus placed in a position where it would inevitably busy itself more or less with education, and as Napoleon was no doubt convinced that the great majority of parents wanted educational work done by or participated in by the clergy, the question might well have reduced itself to one of expediency. Further, M. Aulard is not sufficiently clear as to whether, assuming the Napoleonic policy to have been simply one of expediency, this policy may not have proceeded with other aims than that of guarding against the inevitable consequences of the existence of the Church. May we not regard it as aiming also to use the Church, through its educational as well as through its religious work, in the fortifying of the new régime? Or may we not conclude that possibly the main thought was to commend the new educational system to the ordinary bourgeois mind by exhibiting the approval and participation of the Church? The first suggestion might indeed be regarded as covered by M. Aulard's assertion that Napoleon “s'intéressait à l'instruction publique comme à une ‘source de pouvoir’” (the phrase is from Roederer, who however does not seem to state that Napoleon viewed the field of education *only* in that light). With respect to the other however, M. Aulard's conclusions might I think be supplemented by the idea that Napoleon had as an additional (if not as an only) motive the hope of assuring the success of the new *lycées*. That is, we are not necessarily to suppose that Napoleon regarded the aid of the Church as essential or even as desir-

able in the work of the school, but as under the conditions highly advantageous in giving the school a fair chance to do its work.

VICTOR COFFIN.

Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte et le Ministère Odilon Barrot, 1849. Par ANDRÉ LEBEY. (Paris: Cornély et Cie. 1912. Pp. xii, 719.)

THE history of the Revolution of 1848 and of the Second Republic is being assiduously and profitably investigated at present by a group of scholars who have already produced a number of notable works on important phases or aspects of the period. The Société de l'Histoire de la Révolution de 1848 and its important review, founded a few years ago, serve usefully to promote these investigations. The Second Republic was a highly complex and incomplete experiment and it failed. The reasons for its failure are of interest and instruction to the supporters of the Third Republic which, having definitely established its political régime, is now attempting the solution of pressing social problems, raised but not solved by the Second Republic.

M. Lebey is already known as the author of an elaborate treatise on *Louis-Napoléon et la Révolution de 1848*. The present volume is a portly one, not much smaller than a volume of the *Cambridge Modern History*, and is concerned with the events of a single year, the life and achievements of the Barrot ministry which lasted, with an important change, from December 11, 1848, to October 31, 1849. The book is the result of extensive research and is of absorbing interest, though characterized by some strong judgments and theories which give one pause. The author threads his way through a very tortuous tangle and we follow, seeing clearly. There are eight spacious chapters: on the Agony of the Constituent Assembly, the Début of the Roman Expedition and the Death of the Constituent, on the Reconstruction of the Ministry with the addition of Tocqueville and his friends, a phase which has been vividly but not impartially described by Tocqueville himself in his *Souvenirs*, on the Insurrection of June 13, 1849, on the relations to each other of the President, the Assembly, and Europe, on the letter to Edgar Ney, on the defeat of the parties and of Parliament when Louis Napoleon dismissed his ministry and showed who was leader in France.

It is a detailed and graphic account of the extinction of a republic by those elected to serve the republic. It is of course impossible briefly to present the contents of over seven hundred pages, but this elaborate monograph will be welcome to all students of the period. It is the story of a *révolution manquée*, a veritable year of dupes. If ever men fished in troubled waters they were the President and the various parties in the year 1849.

M. Lebey shows the isolation of Louis Napoleon at the beginning of his presidency. Though borne to power by over five million votes, he knew no single important man who stood for his interests, he had no